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COMMENTS
TITLE VII AND NEGATIVE JOB
REFERENCES: EMPLOYEES FIND SAFE
HARBOR IN ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL
COMPANY
MATTHEW J. CLEVELAND*

INTRODUCTION

Imagine for a moment, that a chicken was an employee on Mr.
Adams' farm. Now imagine Mr. Adams fired that employee because there were too many chickens on the farm. Upon its release,
the chicken filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),' claiming that it was discriminated
against and fired because of its race.2 While the charge was
pending, the chicken decided to get a new job at Betty Lou's Farm,
which requested a job reference from Mr. Adams regarding his
former employee. 3 Mr. Adams supplied Betty Lou with a negative
job reference, and Betty Lou refused to hire the chicken. The
chicken, believing that Mr. Adams provided the negative job reference in retaliation for filing the discrimination charge with the
EEOC, filed another charge against Mr. Adams under Title VII's
* J.D. Candidate, June 1998.

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(a) & 2000e-5(b) (1994). Congress, through Title
VII, created the EEOC to investigate and attempt to resolve unlawful discrimination practices. Id. §§ 2000e-4(a) & 2000e-5(b). See James Francis
Barna, Keeping the Boss at Bay Post-TerminationRetaliation Under Title VII,
47 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 259, 267-69 (1995) (analyzing the applicability of § 704(a) to post-employment retaliation claims in the Third Circuit).

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) may also file suit
on behalf of the employee or authorize the employee to file suit against his or
her employer if it reasonably believes the charge to be true. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f).
2. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 327-28 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd,
117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (discussing a former employee bringing suit against a
former employer for retaliation under Title VII § 704(a)). In the Robinson

case, a former employee claimed he had been discriminated against because
he was black. Id. at 327. The facts outlined in Robinson provide some basis
for the above textual hypothetical.
3. See id. at 327. Robinson attempted to get a job at another company,
which requested a job reference from Shell Oil Company. Id.
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At this point, the question is not

whether a chicken' may sue under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, but whether the chicken, as a former employee, may sue
the former employer under the same provision.5 Instead of determining what is a chicken, the question now becomes "what is
an employee?"
In 1960, the Honorable Henry J. Friendly of the Federal District Court in New York asked the question, "what is a chicken?"7
Although to most, this would seem like a rather simple question,
apparently there was enough confusion regarding the definition,
meaning and understanding of this word to merit a trial in a federal district court.' What does chicken have to do with Title VII9
and discrimination in the workplace? To date, there has not been
a single reported incident involving a chicken being discriminated
against in the workplace, or more specifically, claiming retaliation
by a former employer who provided a bad job reference to a subsequent employer. Yet, the problem Judge Friendly had in defining
a chicken ° is the same problem a number of circuits were having
in determining who an employee is in relation to Title VII's retaliation provision."
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
5. See Brief for Charles T. Robinson, Sr. at *i, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
116 S. Ct. 1541 (1996) (No. 95-1376) (asking whether a former employee is
covered by the anti-retaliation provision in Title VII).
6. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116,
117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
7. Id. In Frigaliment,there was a contract dispute between the parties as
to what the word "chicken" meant. Id. One side defined chicken as "a young
chicken, suitable for broiling and frying," while the opposing counsel defined
chicken as "any bird of that genus that meets contract specifications on weight
and quality, including what it calls 'stewing chicken'." Id. Judge Friendly
ruled that in order to enforce a particular meaning of a common term, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant had actual knowledge of that particular meaning or knowledge of a universal usage or meaning. Id. at 119.
8. Id. at 118. Judge Friendly noted that because the word chicken was
ambiguous, it was necessary to look at the contract language to determine the
proper interpretation. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
10. Frigaliment,190 F. Supp. at 117.
11. See Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 891 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding Title VII protected former employees); Robinson, 70 F.3d at 332
(ruling that Title VII does not protect former employees); Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1994) (instructing the district
court to broadly interpret § 704(a) to include former employees); Reed v.
Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 493 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that former employees are
not covered under Title VII § 704(a)); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506,
1509-10 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that the exclusion of former employees
would undermine the clear remedial purposes of Title VII); O'Brien v. Sky
Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that former employees
required protection under Title VII), overruled on other grounds by Atonio v.
Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc);
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The circuits were split on how to define an employee. 2 The
problem lay in statutory construction because the majority of circuits that confronted the issue believed the word "employee" in Title VII should be read broadly to include former employees. 3 Conversely, the minority of circuits stood firm on the ground of strict
statutory interpretation excluding former employees from Title
VII's definition of employee. 4 Due to such a conflict among the
circuits, the Supreme Court, in 1996, agreed to hear Robinson v.
6
a case from the Fourth Circuit, in order to
Shell Oil Company,"
determine who really is an employee in relation to Title VII's antiretaliation provision.
However, in order to answer that particular question, the Supreme Court needed to tackle the difficult, but necessary, task of
statutory interpretation. Additionally, the Court needed to determine if it wished to base its decision on policy considerations or
clear rules defining statutory interpretation. Not unlike the sim17
ple question asked by Judge Friendly some thirty-six years ago,
the Supreme Court faced seemingly simple questions such as: (1)
Who is an employee?; 8 (2) What does it mean to be "employed?"; 9
Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1978)
(reasoning that a narrow construction excluding former employees would not
give effect to the statute's purpose); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 1977) (deciding to include former employees under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision).
12. See supra note 11 listing decisions from various United States Court of
Appeals addressing the issue of former employees and § 704(a) of Title VII.
13. See Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 891 (holding that Title VII applied to former
employees so long as the alleged retaliatory acts were related to the plaintiffs
employment); Charlton, 25 F.3d at 199-200 (deciding to broadly interpret §
704(a) *of Title VII to include former employees); Bailey, 850 F.2d at 1509
(relying on policy considerations to broadly interpret Title VII's retaliation
provision); O'Brien, 670 F.2d at 869 (holding that an allegation of a bad recommendation after termination was sufficient to assert a retaliation claim);
Pantchenko, 581 F.2d at 1054-55 (reasoning that a narrow construction of Title VII would not give effect to the statute's purpose); Rutherford, 565 F.2d at
1165 (holding a narrow interpretation of the statute would not live up to the
legislative intent behind the statute's anti-discriminatory policy).
14. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330 (finding that the terms used in Title VII
are not ambiguous, and therefore are not subject to a broad interpretation);
Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1365 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that posttermination acts of a former employer were not actionable by former employees under Title VII's retaliation provision), vacated on other grounds sub
nom., Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993).
15. 116 S. Ct. 1541 (1996).
16. Robinson, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997). The exact issue presented to the Court
was "[d]oes Title VII § 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 give former employees a cause of action for acts of retaliation allegedly occurring after the
employment relationship has ended?" Brief for Shell Oil Co. at *i, Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 116 S. Ct. 1541 (1996) (No. 95-1376).
17. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116,
117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
18. An employee is defined as, "a person in the service of another under
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and (3) Can a former employee be considered a current employee
under Title VII? While the first two questions seemed simple
enough, the third question seemed to border on the absurd. Yet,
the Supreme Court determined that there was a need for clarification regarding these questions due to the conflict among the circuit
courts.
Before addressing the Court's decision and its progeny, it is
important to first understand the historical background of Title
V11 21 and statutory construction. Part I examines the precise language of Title VII § 704(a),22 as well as § 7013 and § 703,2 and
provides a historical look at how the circuits have interpreted §
704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After establishing the historical background of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, Part II
provides an analysis of why the Supreme Court erred in Robinson
when it determined that Title VII § 704 protected former employees. Part II also highlights remedies, other than Title VII remedies that are readily available to former employees, which the Supreme Court summarily dismissed. Following the analysis, Part
III offers a proposal to Congress, as well as a guide for employers
in light of the Robinson decision. Finally, this Comment asserts
that it is unnecessary for Title VII to include former employees.
Not only are former employees protected by laws other than Title
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the employer
has the power or right to control and direct the employee in the material details of how the work is to be performed." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 525 (6th
ed. 1990).
19. Employed means "performing work under an employer-employee relationship." Id.
20. A majority of the circuit courts have held that a former employee does
have a cause of action against his former employer under Title VII § 704(a).
See Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 891 (ruling that Title VII did apply to former em-

ployees so long as the alleged retaliatory acts were related to the plaintiffs
employment); Charlton,25 F.3d at 202 (holding that § 704(a) protects former
employees); Bailey, 850 F.2d at 1509 (deciding that a strict interpretation does
not effectuate the statute's remedial purpose); O'Brien, 670 F.2d at 869

(reasoning that an allegation of a bad recommendation after termination was
sufficient to assert a retaliation claim); Pantchenko, 581 F.2d at 1054-55
(allowing a broad interpretation of § 704(a) to further the underlying purpose

of Title VII by preventing discrimination in the workplace); Rutherford, 565

F.2d at 1165 (holding a narrow interpretation of the statute would not live up

to the legislative intent behind the statute's anti-discriminatory policy). But

see Robinson, 70 F.3d at 332 (holding that when the language of a statute is
plain and unambiguous, judicial inquiry must cease), Koelsch v. Beltone Electronics Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the Seventh Circuit does not recognize causes of action of former employees under § 704(a) of

Title VII), and Reed, 939 F.2d at 492 (finding that former employees are not
covered under Title VII § 704(a)).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et al. (1994).

22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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VII, but such an exclusion will maintain the integrity of Title VII.
Before reaching this conclusion, though, it is necessary to understand the historical background of Title VII § 704(a) and the cases
surrounding it.
I.

A LOOK

INTO TITLE

VII

AND ITS PROGENY

It would be impossible to provide an accurate analysis of Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision without first exploring the words
and meanings within the statute itself. More importantly, it is essential to understand the purpose behind Title VII before trying to
understand how the courts have interpreted it. Section A focuses
on the precise language and purpose of Title VII. Section B discusses the majority view, which the Supreme Court eventually
adopted, granting former employees a cause of action under Title
VII § 704(a). Next, Section C examines how the Seventh Circuit
historically excluded former employees from protection under §
704(a) but changed its stance prior to the Robinson decision. Section D examines the minority view from the Fourth Circuit, which
did not allow former employees a cause of action under § 704(a).
Finally, Section E will provide a brief overview of the Supreme
Court's decision and reasoning in reversing the Fourth Circuit in
the Robinson case.
A. Eradicationof Discriminationin the Workplace
In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.25
The purpose behind Title VII was to "eliminate ... discrimination
in employment based on race, color, religion, [sex], or national
origin"26 and to enhance the hiring opportunities of minorities "on
the basis of merit."27 The first section of Title VII defines an employee as "an individual employed by an employer." 28 This definition controls the understanding and meaning of the word employee
throughout Title VII. 29 The first section of Title VII also defines
the word employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. " 30 The legislative history indicates that unless

25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994)).
26. H.R.REP. NO. 914, at 11 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2401.
27. See 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).

See

also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) (stating that the
purpose of Title VII was to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past").
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
29. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (applying the word employee
throughout the equal employment opportunities statutes).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). See generally Recent Case, 109 HARV. L. REV. 675
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otherwise limited by the Act, the word "employer" is intended to
have its ordinary dictionary meaning.81 Congress clearly acknowledged that there was some confusion here but did not intend for a
broad interpretation of the statutory language. 2
While § 703 of Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin,83 Title VII
also includes an anti-retaliation provision in § 704(a). 34 This provision protects employees and applicants from discrimination by
an employer for their involvement in protesting unlawful discrimination employment practices or involvement in proceedings
related to such practices. 5 Section 704(a) explicitly protects two
groups of individuals, employees and applicants for employment. 6
This Section is much narrower in coverage than that of § 703,
which prohibits discrimination towards any individual. 7 The legislative history on Title VII, in general, offers little guidance in determining whether Congress actually intended for former employees during post-termination retaliatory action to be protected

(1996) (discussing the Seventh Circuit's narrow definition of "employer" for
the purposes of Title VII).
31. 110 CONG. REC. 7216 (1964) (responding to Sen. Dirksen Memorandum).
Question. Who is an employer within the meaning of title VII? I am
not sure, the bill is indefinite, we have no committee hearings, no report. Can an employer readily ascertain from the language of the bill
whether or not he is included?... Answer. The term "employer" is intended to have its common dictionary meaning, except as expressly
qualified by the act.
Id.
32. See id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). This provision states in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
Id.
35. Id. This section also states that it is as an unlawful employment prac-

tice for "an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee ... to
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership." Id. It is important to include "individual," "member," and "applicant for membership," in
order to analyze who is specifically protected within the context of § 704(a).
See infra notes 129-58 and accompanying text for an analysis of Title VII's
words and context.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, ET AL., FEDERAL
STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 185 (1980). See Sibley
Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that the
coverage of § 703 is broader than that of § 704(a)).
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under § 704(a).*8
It is clear from the plain language of the statute that employees and applicants for employment are specifically granted protection under § 704(a).39 The only legislative material relating to §
704(a) is a House Labor Committee report which describes who to
protect from retaliation by casually using the word "person" instead of "employee."40 Yet, Title VII, as enacted, contains the more
limiting terms "his employees." 41 Although by just looking at the
plain language of § 704, there is no mention of former employees.
The majority of circuits strongly believed that such an interpretathe context of Title VII and Congress' intent in
tion exists within
41
writing the Act.

B. The Majority:Policy Considerations

A number of circuits relied on the belief that § 704(a) was
ambiguous, thus warranting a broad interpretation to include former employees under its protection.4 This Section will look at decisions from the Tenth, Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. The decisions of these circuits constituted the majority view
of interpreting "former employees," which the Supreme Court
adopted in its Robinson decision.
38. Patricia A. Moore, Parting is Such Sweet Sorrow: The Application of
Title VII to Post-Employment Retaliation, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 205, 210
(1993). Moore argues that Title VII's retaliation provision protects former
employees. Id. at 219-24. She bases her argument on the assumption that
the exclusion of former employees would overlook the broad purpose and intent of Congress' enactment of Title VII. Id. at 224. Moore does suggest,
however, that there is a possibility of abuse of such protection of post-

termination actions. Id. To further justify her stance, Moore qualifies her
conclusion by stating that § 704(a) "should protect only those postemployment actions that relate to an employment relationship." Id. This
qualification clearly ignores the fact that there are other remedies available to
former employees, and they should not rely on Title VII in this context. See
infra notes 192-204 and accompanying text discussing other remedies available to former employees.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a) (1994).
40. H.R.REP. No. 1370, at 11 (1962).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a). See Davel v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 559, 562 (7th
Cir. 1990) (noting that statutory language controls the interpretation of the
statute over the language in the legislative history).
42. See infra notes 44-71 and accompanying text discussing the majority of
circuits which include former employees under Title VII § 704(a).
43. See generally Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881 (7th Cir.
1996); Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994); Sherman
v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990); Bailey v. USX
Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864

(9th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing
Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987); Pantchenko v. Dolge C.B. Co., 581 F.2d
1052 (2d Cir. 1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d
1162 (10th Cir. 1977). These cases have all held that § 704(a) of Title VII protects former employees from retaliation.
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In Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce," the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals allowed a former employee to bring a discrimination suit against her former employer under § 704(a) of Title VII. The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument
that § 704(a) applies only to "employees and applicants for employment," not former employees.' The court simply stated that
as a remedial statute, Title VII should be liberally construed.
Without discussing the legislative history of § 704(a), the Tenth
Circuit asserted that a literal reading would not be justified.'
Following the Rutherford decision, the Second Circuit also
allowed the plaintiff to file suit against her former employer under
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.49 In Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge
Co.,50 the court used reasoning similar to that in Rutherford stating that a narrow interpretation would not effectuate the statute's
purpose.5 The court concluded that because the purpose of Title
VII was to prohibit discrimination in the workplace, a broad inter2
pretation justified including former employees under § 704(a).
44. 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
45. Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1163. Rutherford was a former bank employee
who voluntarily resigned from her job at the American Bank of Commerce
(the Bank). Id. She filed a sexual discrimination charge against the Bank,
which was later resolved in favor of the Bank. See Rutherford v. American
Bank of Commerce, No. 74-1313 (10th Cir. filed January 27, 1975) (affirming
the District Court's finding that there was no sexual discrimination). Rutherford attempted to get two other jobs, one at another bank and one with an
airline. Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1164. Both prospective employers requested
recommendations from her former employer. Id. Her former employer informed both prospective employers that Rutherford had filed sex discrimination charges against the Bank. Id.
46. Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1165.
47. Id. Using this reasoning, the court pointed to broad interpretations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by other circuit courts which included
former employees as protected persons, even though the interpretations were
not specifically stated in the statutory language. Id. at 1165-66. See Dunlop v.
Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1977) (interpreting the Fair
Labor Standards Act to include the protection of former employees); Hodgson
v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir.
1972) (holding that the FLSA affords protection to former employees).
48. Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1165. Additionally, the court did not discuss or
raise the issue of any ambiguities in the language of § 704(a) to further support its broad interpretation. Id.
49. Pantchenko, 581 F.2d at 1055. A female chemist filed sexual discrimination charges against her former employer. Id. at 1054. The plaintiff filed
another charge against her former employer for retaliation under § 704(a) after the defendant allegedly refused to write her a letter of recommendation
and "made disparaging and untrue statements about her to her prospective
employers." Id.
50. 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978).
51. Id. at 1055.
52. Id. (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Tremaine, 133 F.2d 827, 830
(2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, C.J.)). "There is no surer guide in the interpretation of a
statute than its purpose when that is sufficiently disclosed." Id. Cf Peter
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53
Similarly, in Charlton v. Paramus Board of Education,
the
Third Circuit refused to strictly interpret § 704(a).' The court set
forth a two part test in order to secure the rights of former employees.55 First, the retaliation must stem from a protection specifically stated in Title VII.56 Second, the protected action and the
retaliation must "arise[ ] out of or... relate[ ] to the employment
relationship."57 The Charlton court held that for purposes of an
employer retaliating against an employee after the employment
relationship has ended, Title VII's definition of the word
"employee" includes former employees.'
Unlike the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit, in O'Brien v. Sky
Chefs, Inc.,9 offered no discussion or analysis of why it decided to
allow a former employee to sue its former employer for retaliation. ° To its credit, though, the O'Brien court did not have the opportunity to fully address this matter because the charging party
dropped the claims of retaliation. 1
In Sherman v. Burke Contracting,Inc.6" and Bailey v. USX
Corp.,6 the Eleventh Circuit relied on the prior opinions from the

Tenth 0 and Second Circuits6 51 to afford protection to former em-

Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)
(observing that "it is commonplace that a literal interpretation of the words of
a statute is not always a safe guide to its meaning").
53. 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994).
54. Charlton, 25 F.3d at 202. The court of appeals remanded the case to
the district court with instructions to broadly interpret § 704(a) to include
former employees. Id. See generally Barna, supra note 1 (analyzing the applicability of § 704(a) to post-employment retaliation claims in the Third Circuit).
55. Charlton, 25 F.3d at 200.
56. Id. An employer may not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Also, an employer
may not retaliate for a charge, testimony, or assistance and participation in
an investigation or hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
57. Charlton,25 F.3d at 200.
58. Id.
59. 670 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Antonio v.
Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987).
60. O'Brien, 670 F.2d at 869. This case involved three female former employees who alleged that their former employer discriminated against them on
the basis of their gender. Id. at 866. In addition, two of the women claimed
their former employer retaliated against them after they filed charges with
the EEOC. Id.
61. Id. at 869. The court did state, however, that after an employee is
terminated and has filed charges with the EEOC, if the employer refuses to
rehire or gives bad recommendations, such action would be sufficient to assert
a claim of retaliation. Id.
62. 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990).
63. 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988).
64. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text discussing the Rutherford decision from the Tenth Circuit.
65. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text discussing the
Pantchenko opinion from the Second Circuit.
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ployees under § 704(a)." In Sherman, the defendant spoke with
the plaintiffs new employer and persuaded the new employer to
fire the plaintiff. 7 The court affirmed the award of $10,000 in
compensatory damages in favor of the plaintiff.' In Bailey, the
court held that a former employee is protected under Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision," and reasoned that a strict interpretation of the statute "would undercut the obvious remedial purposes
of Title VII."70 The Seventh Circuit eventually adopted this view,
although the court historically excluded former employees from
Title VII's protection.
C. The Seventh Circuit:Confusion or Conformity?
The Seventh Circuit aligned more with the majority view
than with the minority view. But, a careful look at the lecisions
that arose out of this Circuit suggest the court interpreted § 704(a)
in such a way as to achieve a desired outcome.7 The court strongly
disfavored discrimination and retaliation of any sort, regardless of
the status of the individual, and wanted to insure protection or a
remedy for the aggrieved individual.72 This Section first focuses on
two cases from the Seventh Circuit, Reed v. Shepard" and Koelsch
v. Beltone Electronics Corp.,' which excluded former employees
from § 704(a) protection. Next, this Section discusses the court's
switch in Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel75 to include former employees
under § 704(a).76
In Reed, the court affirmed a district court's ruling that a
former employee was not protected under § 704(a) of Title VII. 77
The court examined the language of § 704(a), rather than relying
on policy considerations, and found that retaliation against an

66. Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1536; Bailey, 850 F.2d at 1509.
67. Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1529.

68. Id. at 1536.
69. Bailey, 850 F.2d at 1509-10.
70. Id.
71. Compare Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1991)

(describing how "discharge or another employment impairment... evidences
actionable retaliation"), and Koelsch v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 709
(7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the assertion that a former employee has a cause of
action under § 704(a)), with Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 888
(7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the court interpreted Title VII liberally to ensure
the remedial nature of the statute).

72. See e.g. Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 886-87 (disregarding established precedent and stare decisis to provide protection for a former employee under §
704(a)).

73.
74.
75.
76.

939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
46 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 1995).
87 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996).
See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the

Veprinsky case.

77. 939 F.2d at 492-93.
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employee in the form of discharge or other adverse employment
action in the current employment relationship constitutes an unfair practice prohibited by § 704(a).78 The court, in other words,
addressed the harm caused to current employees by an employer's
retaliation to that employee's protected statutory activity.79 Soon
after the decision in Reed, the Seventh Circuit in Koelsch clearly
asserted its position regarding former employees and § 704(a) of
Title VII." The court stated that § 704(a) does not afford a cause of
action for post-termination events. 1
Contrary to the ruling in Reed and Koelsch, one year later the
court in Veprinsky held that a former employee, adversely affected
by post-termination acts of retaliation, has a cause of action under
Title VII § 704(a).82 The court justified its holding by asserting
that Reed had been too broadly interpreted,' and that the remarks
made in Koelsch were dictum.' Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit
specifically pointed to the growing number of circuits which allowed Title VII protection of former employees from retaliation. 8
The court, feeling the sudden need to clarify its previous decisions,
reasoned that if protection under § 704(a) extended only to an
employee and an applicant, it would greatly undermine the purpose behind Title VII.6
Furthermore, the court criticized the Fourth Circuit's reliance
upon Reed.87 In fact, the Seventh Circuit appeared to be saying
78. Id. The court also relied on the district court's finding that the alleged
retaliation took place after the plaintiffs termination, and therefore was not
an adverse employment action protected under § 704(a). Id.
79. Id.
80. Koelsch, 46 F.3d at 709. In this case, a former employee of Beltone
Electronics filed suit complaining that a fellow employee sexually harassed
her while employed at Beltone. Id. at 706. The plaintiff also claimed that she
was fired in retaliation for reporting the alleged harassment. Id. The plaintiff
stated that she continued to be a victim of sexual harassment following her
termination. Id. at 709. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish
that the employer discharged her in retaliation for reporting the alleged harassment. Id. at 708.
81. Id. at 709 (citing Reed, 939 F.2d at 492).
82. Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 891.
83. Id. at 884-89. See Koelsch, 46 F.3d at 709 (remarking "the law in this
circuit is quite clear.., that post-termination events are not actionable under
§ 2000e-3(a).").
84. Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 886. In arriving at the holding in Veprinsky, the
court based its decision on policy arguments echoed from the other circuits
holding the majority view. Id. See supra notes 54-81 and accompanying text
discussing the majority of circuits holding in favor of former employees.
85. Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 884-85.
86. Id. at 889-91.
87. Id. at 886-88. The court stated that the decision in Reed provided the
basis for the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of § 704(a) to not protect former
employees from retaliation. Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 886. The court also discussed at length how the Fourth Circuit incorrectly relied on Reed as a basis
for its holding in both Polsby and Robinson. Id. at 886.
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that "but for" the misinterpretation of Reed, the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of § 704(a) would include former employees. This
seems unfounded considering that the Fourth Circuit presented a
number of solid arguments to support its decision to exclude former employees from § 704(a).8
89
D. "The Mouse that Roared":
The Fourth Circuit

The Fourth Circuit held the minority opinion excluding former employees from § 704(a) protection until the Supreme Court
reversed it in Robinson v. Shell Oil Company." In so holding, the
Fourth Circuit based its decisions on strict statutory construction,
rather than broad policy considerations. 91 Two cases distinctly set
forth the Fourth Circuit's view regarding former employees in relation to Title VII's retaliation provision: Polsby v. Chase92 and
Robinson."
In Polsby, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Reed to find that § 704(a) of Title VII did not
cover post-termination acts of retaliation.95 Furthermore, the court

88. See infra notes 91-117 and accompanying text discussing the arguments and reasoning set forth in the decisions from the Fourth Circuit.
89. LEONARD WIBBERLEY, THE MOUSE THAT ROARED (1955). This book is
about a little country, which was basically an island "five miles long and three
miles wide," named Pinot Grand Fenwick. Id. at 4. This country decided to
wage war on the United States so that it could lose and receive aid from the
U.S. Government. Id. at 51-52. The significance of the book lies in the fact
that this small island ended up defeating the United States despite the odds.
Id. at 164.
90. 117 S. Ct. 843, 849 (1997).
91. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd,
117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (criticizing other circuits for not adhering to established
rules of statutory construction and interpretation).
92. 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds sub nom.,
Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993).
93. 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
94. 970 F.2d 1360. In this case, the plaintiff claimed her former employer
retaliated against her by writing a letter to the American Board of Psychiatry
and Neurology. Id. at 1362. The plaintiff alleged that the letter contained
errors that resulted in the Board denying her residency credit for the time
spent working for the defendant. Id. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant refused her requests to correct the errors in the letter. Id. at 1364.
95. Id. at 1365. The court looked at the plain language of § 704(a), and determined that § 704(a) did not include the term "former employee." Id. at
1365-67. The court also relied, in part, on a concurrence in Sherman v. Burke
Contracting,Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1536 (11th Cir. 1990). In Sherman, Judge
Tjoflat's concurrence admitted that he was bound to follow the precedent set
by Bailey, 850 F.2d at 1509, but disagreed that § 704(a) protected former employees. Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1536. The concurrence not only argued that §
704(a) applied to current employees and applicants for employment, but that
the retaliation provision limited recoverable damages by providing equitable
relief rather than money damages. Id. at 1538. But cf. Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 102 (1), 105 Stat. 1074 (1991) (amending Title VII
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reasoned that Congress specifically included "applicants for employment as distinct from an employee to be protected from retaliation, [and therefore] Congress could certainly have also included a former employee if it had desired."' Finally, the Fourth
Circuit criticized other circuits for not only failing to recognize the
clear language of Title VII, but for focusing on questionable policy
considerations for their holdings.7
In Robinson, the Fourth Circuit had the opportunity to again
address the question whether former employees are protected under § 704(a) of Title VII. 8 The court, sitting en banc, held that the
retaliation provision of Title VII does not protect former employees." The court acknowledged that this holding was inconsistent
with the majority of circuits which have also considered the issue," but it felt that those circuits had summarily dismissed clear
logical methods of statutory interpretation without any sound justification.'0 '
The Fourth Circuit presented four major arguments to bolster
its holding. First, the court looked to the actual language in §
704(a) and concluded that no ambiguities existed because the word
"former" does not appear anywhere in Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision.'
The Fourth Circuit further stated that Congress
would have explicitly included former employees had it so intended. 03 Therefore, the exclusion of former employees strongly
suggests that Congress had no intention of extending protection
beyond the employment relationship to former employees under §
704(a).'04
Second, the Fourth Circuit addressed Robinson's assertion
to provide for compensatory and punitive damages).
96. Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1365.
97. Id.

98. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 327.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 331-32.
101. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-

41 (1989) (stating that the Court's inquiry ceases where the language of the
statute is unambiguous); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)
(stating that the duty of interpretation does not arise where the language of
the statute "is plain and admits of no more than one meaning").
102. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330.

103. Id.
104. Id. See United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 506

(2d Cir. 1991) (reasoning that absent expressed congressional intent, the normal meaning should control). See also 2A GEORGE SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.07, 152 (5th ed. 1992) (stating that "a
definition which declares what a term means ...excludes any meaning that is
not stated"). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the proper interpretation of this remedial statute, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 116 S.Ct.
1541 (1996), and eventually held that former employees could bring a cause of
action under § 704(a) of Title VII for post-termination retaliation. Robinson,

117 S. Ct. at 849.
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that the term "employee" was ambiguous, thus warranting judicial
interpretation to include former employees in the definition of
employees under § 701(f). 105 The court explicitly rejected Robinson's contention. The court reasoned that "[b]ecause Title VII does
not define 'employee' as an individual no longer employed by an
employer, then, under the rules of statutory construction, that6
meaning is excluded as a meaning from the term 'employee'."'0
Furthermore, the court discussed the rules of statutory construction which requires courts to give words their common ordinary
usage, and determined that logic dictated that "employed" and
"employer" as used in § 701(f) and § 704(a) could only contemplate
an existing employment relationship.0 7 Having thus concluded
that no ambiguities existed, the Fourth Circuit refused to look to
legislative history or other sources of legislative intent, and refused to engage in any further analysis of the issue regarding the
ambiguity of the statute.0 8
However, the Fourth Circuit embarked on a discussion of two
additional points, which further supported their holding and interpretation of § 704(a). The court first addressed the fact that Title VII is a statute, which contemplates protection of individuals
from discrimination in an existing employment relationship.l °9
Furthermore, the court asserted that Congress did not design Title
VII to provide protection to persons outside of an existing employment relationship with the exception, being specifically addressed
by Congress, to include "applicants for employment. ""° If an employer does discharge an employee because of his race, for example, that employee is protected by Title VII because the discriminatory action occurred when there was an on-going employment
relationship."' Additionally, if that discharged employee then goes
to another employer and is refused employment for the sole reason
that the discharged employee filed a Title VII discrimination
charge against his former employer, then that discharged employee is protected by § 704 from the new employer's retaliatory

105. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330. The court responded to Robinson's argument
by stating that, "[his contention is legally untenable." Id.
106. Id.
See 2A GEORGE SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.07, at 132 (5th ed. 1992) (stating that "as a general rule 'a

definition which declares what a term means excludes any meaning that is
not stated'").

107. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330. The court referred to Black's Law Dictionary
to determine the common usage of the terms "employed" and "employer." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 330-31.
110. Id. at 331.

111. Id. Although the employee would bring suit against the employer as a
former employee, it would not change the fact that Title VII does not contemplate the protection of former employees because the discriminatory act took
place when an employment relationship existed. Id.
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refusal as "an applicant for employment." ' 12
Next, the Fourth Circuit focused on the fact that § 704(a) does
not specifically account for one of the particular elements of
claiming retaliation under Title VII: "adverse employment action."1 13 Under § 704, an employee or applicant for employment14
claiming retaliation must suffer an "adverse employment action.'
The court reasoned that adverse employment action could only occur where a current employment relationship existed."' The court,
referring to language from the Seventh Circuit's decision in Reed,
stated, "because 'the alleged retaliatory activities took place after
the termination of Reed's employment' those activities were 'not an
adverse employment action.'""' This reasoning falls well within
the Congressional intent of discouraging discrimination in the
workplace, as well as allowing discrimination charges to be
brought without fear of retaliation from their employers. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court refused to accept this line of reasoning and adopted a broad, more "legislative", approach by reading
the word "former" into the language of § 704(a).
E.

JudicialActivism at Work

In early 1996, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there
was a split among the circuit courts on whether Title VII § 704(a)
protected former employees from retaliation and granted certorari
for the Robinson case from the Fourth Circuit." 7 The Supreme
Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of § 704(a) and
accepted the broad interpretations and constructions adopted by
the majority of circuits in order to be "more consistent with the
broader context of Title VII and the primary purpose of § 704(a)."" 8
The Court attempted to adhere to proper methods of statutory interpretation by first addressing the ambiguity or clarity of the
precise language of the Act."9 Interestingly, the Court actually
looked beyond the precise language, and instead looked at the
"broader context of the statute as a whole," and concluded that the
language was ambiguous. 2' The Court supported that conclusion
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
113. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 331.

114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
115. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 331. The court specifically stated, "[a]dverse employment action necessarily requires that the adverse action taken by the
employer must be in relation to its own act of employing the employee bringing the charge." Id.
116. Id. (citing Reed, 939 F.2d at 492-93).
117. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 116 S.Ct. 1541 (1996).
118. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S.Ct. 843, 849 (1997).
119. Id. at 846.
120. Id. Upon reciting this rule, the Court summarily stated, "consideration
of those factors leads us to conclude that the term "employees," as used in §
704(a), is ambiguous as to whether it excludes former employees." Id.
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by focusing on the absence of any "temporal qualifiers" to limit the
interpretation of the word "employees"
in both § 704(a) and Title
121
VII's definition of the word in § 701(f).
Next, the Supreme Court focused on other provisions within
Title VII utilizing the word "employees" to show that, within those
contexts, the word implicitly included "former" employees. 1 2 Al-

though there are also a number of provisions in which the word

"employees" could only contemplate current employees, the Court
reasoned that this fact only strengthened the argument that the
word "employee" was, by itself, ambiguous." This determination
opened the door for the Court to broadly construe the language of
the statute and read the word "former" into the definition of employee, as it appears in § 704(a).
Keeping in mind the remedial purpose behind Title VII, yet
ignoring that the statute did not contemplate post-employment
protection, the Court asserted that former employees must be protected from retaliation in § 704."2 The main focus of the court revolved around the possible chilling effect, which could result by not
protecting former employees."' The Court accepted the argument
made by the EEOC, which stated:
[E]xclusion of former employees from the protection of § 704(a)
would undermine the effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the
threat of post-employment retaliation to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, and would provide perverse
incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring Title VII
claims.126
By protecting former employees from post-termination re-

121. Id. at 846-47. The Court felt that there was a distinction to be made
because the statute does not define an employee as an individual who "is"
employed by an employer. Id. Rather, the Court pointed out that the definition, as written in Title VII and not Black's Law Dictionary, states that an
employee is "an individual employed by an employer." Id. The Court further
stated that the ambiguity rested in the fact that the definition could very easily be interpreted as referring to an individual who "was" employed by an
employer. Id. Interestingly, the Court used this same type of circular reasoning when it asserted that Congress could very well have included the word
"current" if it had, indeed, wished to specifically exclude former employees.
Id.
122. Id. at 847.
123. Id. However, the Court stated, "the term 'employees' may have a plain
meaning in the context of a particular section-not that the term has the
same meaning in all other sections and in all other contexts. Id. This sug-

gests that the language in § 704(a) could very well have been given its plain
meaning, yet it was more convenient for the Court to find ambiguity in order
to broadly interpret the provision to include former employees, thus extending
the protection of Title VII.
124. Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 848.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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taliation, the Court felt that it was "[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms."'27 Although the majority
of circuits historically supported the Supreme Court's decision, the
Court went too far in its interpretation of § 704(a) by inserting
language into the statute which did not exist prior to its decision
nor which was meant to exist there at all.
II. WHEN INTERPRETATION GOES Too FAR

Having established the historical foundation of Title VII, the
focus now shifts to why Title VII's retaliation provision excludes
former employees from its protection. In this analysis, Section A
shows that the Supreme Court erred by broadly interpreting § 704.
Section B reveals that despite the Court's holding, no ambiguities
exist regarding the word "employee" or its definition. Section C
focuses on the inapplicability of the two exceptions to the plainmeaning rule of statutory construction. Then, Section D briefly
analyzes how the Fair Labor Standards Act and other remedial
statutes impact the interpretation of Title VII. Finally, Section E
further analyzes what protections are provided to former employees aside from Title VII. The most important step in this analysis
is determining what role the court will assume when interpreting
this statute.
A. The Courts as Superlegislatures
"What this all boils down to is who is going to make the
laws?"9 It is undisputed that the courts have the power to interpret the laws."9 When interpreting a statute, courts must begin
127. Id.
128. Telephone Interview with L. Christopher Butler, Counsel of Record for
Shell Oil Company (Sept. 5, 1996). Montesquieu also warned against the
courts involving themselves with legislative powers, stating, "there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative ....Were it

joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed
to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator." CHARLES DE
SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Bk. XI, Ch. 6,

151-52 (J.V. Prichard ed. & Thomas Nugent trans., 1955).
129. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173-79
(1803) (establishing judicial review as the proper role of the judiciary). In
addition, since the time of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court has proclaimed adamantly that it does not "sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
731 (1963); See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (asserting
that the Court is not a superlegislature determining "the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions"). Although these cases deal primarily with the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, the very pronouncement that the Court is not a superlegislature is
highly significant. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 532 & 545-46 (1947) (describing how legisla-
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first by looking at the statutory language. ° If certain words are
not included within the statutory language, courts are not free to
rewrite the statute or fill in perceived gaps.'2 ' Upon examination,
Title VII's retaliation provision specifically refers to "employees"
and "applicants for employment;" 3 ' nowhere does it mention
"former employees. " " A broad interpretation of the language in
Title VII to include former employees would, in essence, require
the court to rewrite that part of the statute."4 This power is well
outside that of the court's judicial power." 5 If courts were arbitrarily allowed to pick and choose how broadly or narrowly to interpret statutes, it would become impossible to know exactly what
a statute means or even what it is trying to accomplish. However,
as a result of the Robinson decision, the Court has done just that,
thus leaving Title VII, as a whole, in a state of flux to be interpreted any way the Court sees fit.
Where statutory language is unambiguous looking at the
plain language, as it is in § 704(a), the court must go no further in

tion should come from legislators, who are chosen to legislate, and not from
the courts).
130. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); Veprinsky v.
Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 1996); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
70 F.2d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 843 (1997).
131. Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 897 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Manion stated that courts are often called upon to interpret a statute. Id. Yet, Judge Manion strongly points out "[i]t
is quite another thing to rewrite a statute to include language Congress chose to
exclude." Id. See Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930) (asserting that
courts must follow the rules of statutory interpretation rather than searching
for underlying meanings); United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir.
1994) (stating that courts should give statutory words their common meaning
and refrain from reading words into the statute which were not originally
there), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 954 (1995).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a) (1994).
133. Id.
134. Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 896-97 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Manion noted that the plain meaning of the word
"employee" cannot be read to include "former employees" because the word
"former" is a modifier that changes the meaning of the word employee. Id.
135. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251
(1926) (stating that "to supply omissions transcends the judicial function"). If
the court rewrote the statute to include former employees, it would disrupt
the very essence of the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine.
See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (discussing the separation of powers in terms of the specifically granted powers rather than separate and distinct government entities); Matthew Bergman, Montesquieu's
Theory of Government and the Framing of the American Constitution, 18
PEPP. L. REv. 1 (1990) (discussing Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers and its impact on the Framer's of the Constitution); William Gwyn, The
Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 474 (1989) (discussing the importance of the separation of
powers to "protect our liberty and prevent tyranny").
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its interpretation of the statute. a6 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged this generally accepted rule of statutory construction, and
yet the highest court in the land seemed to ignore or overlook the
fact that the plain language of § 704(a) did not contain the word
"former" nor did it refer to "former employees."317 The Supreme
Court once stated that courts should refrain from "exercis[ing] a
high degree of ingenuity in the effort to find justification for
wrenching from. the words of a statute a meaning which literally
they did not bear."'3 Yet in the Robinson decision, the Court
"wrenched" from the plain words of § 704(a), "his employees and
applicants for employment," one small, albeit significant word,
"former."'39 In a world where stare decisis forms the basis of our
common law system, the Supreme Court's action not only callously
ignores this, but transcends and desecrates another deeply rooted
concept in our federal system, the separation of powers doctrine.
B. The Absence of Ambiguities Within Title VII
The statutory interpretation of Title VII must go no further
than the plain language because no ambiguities exist.'4 Does the
statute specifically state that former employees are protected? No,
so how can ambiguities exist? "His employees," "applicant for employment," and "members" are clear classifications of those individuals § 704(a) protects.14 ' Because these terms are self-limiting,
they do not allow room for broad definitions. In contrast, the word
"individual" may have permitted a broader definition, including
even former employees.' 4 ' Had Congress really intended for former

136. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 328-29 (4th Cir. 1995). See
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) (reasoning
that it is unnecessary for the court to inquire any further into the statutory
language where the "scheme is coherent and consistent"); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (stating that the court's duty to interpret the
statute does not arise where only one meaning exists and the language of the
statute is plain).

137. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 328. The Fourth Circuit specifically stated,
"[clourts are not free to read into the language what is not there, but rather
should apply the statute as written." Id.
138. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930).
139. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 846-47 (1997).
140. Ron PairEnters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 240-41. This case focused on the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. Id. at 235, 237. The court went

into a lengthy discussion regarding statutory interpretation. Id. at 241-44.
The court began by looking at the statutory language. Id. at 241. Applying a
rule of statutory interpretation, the court concluded that there was no reason

to look beyond the plain language of the statute because "the plain meaning of
legislation should be conclusive." Id. at 241-42.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying
text discussing the definition of employee.
142. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
the word "individual" is used broadly.
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employees to be protected, however, it could have easily done so by
simply stating, "an employer may not retaliate against any individual."'4
Yet, one argument is that the word employee, as defined by §
701(a) of Title VII,'" is ambiguous. 145 Because this argument relies
on the mistaken assumption that the word employee is ambiguous,
it is necessary to turn to the legislative history for explanation.'"
As stated before, the legislative history regarding the definition of
the word "employee" offers little insight into congressional intent. 47 More importantly, the final language of the act limited the
protection to "employees" rather than "persons."48 Interestingly,
looking at the legislative history, it is clear that Congress intended
1
the word "employer" to have its common dictionary meaning. 41
Therefore, it would not be wrong to interpret the word "employee"
in much the same manner. This would also be consistent with the
rules of statutory interpretation."' °
Furthermore, in the absence of express congressional intent,
courts should rely on the plain language and common, ordinary
meaning of that language."' Not only does this maintain a level of

143. Brief for Shell Oil Co. at *15, Robinson (No. 95-1376). The Respondent
carefully looks at both words, "employee" and "individual," noting that an individual can become an employee. Id. at *14. In addition, the respondent
particularly focuses on how the two words are used differently in § 703(a) and
§ 704(a) to reach the conclusion that the word individual takes on a broader
interpretation than the words "employee" or "applicant for employment." Id.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). An employee is "an individual employed by an
employer." Id.
145. Brief for Charles T. Robinson, Sr. at *8-18, Robinson (No. 95-1376).
146. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S.
Ct. 843 (1997).
147. See supra note 38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history of Title VII's retaliation provision.
148. See generally Davel v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 559, 562 (7th Cir. 1990)
(asserting that statutory language controls over those stated in the legislative
history).
149. 110 CONG. REC. 7216 (1964). This was a response to Senator Dirksen's
memorandum questioning how to define the word "employer." Id. The response specifically stated that beyond the limitations imposed on the definition of the word "employer" by the statutory language, the "common dictionary meaning" applied. Id.
150. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 328 (asserting that terms in a statute be given
their "common usage"); United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d
501, 506 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that "the words of a statute should be given
their normal meaning and effect in absence of showing that some other
meaning was intended").
151. See Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1528 (11th
Cir. 1996). See also Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (stating that plain language controls unless Congress
clearly expressed its intent to the contrary); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S.
37, 42 (1979) (discussing "a fundamental canon of statutory construction...
that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordi-
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consistency in judicial power when interpreting statutes, but it
also maintains the doctrine of the separation of powers."' Applying such reasoning to Title VII would justify the exclusion of former employees because there was no expressed intent3 in the legislative history to extend the protections of the statute.15
Another argument, which supports a broad interpretation of §
704(a), is that the word "employed" within the definition of
"employee" is also ambiguous.TM This argument, however, is completely unfounded and borders on the ridiculous. Title VII was not
designed to protect people from discrimination outside the workplace. 5 To argue that being employed, within the context of §
704(a), means anything other than having a current employment
relationship runs contrary to common sense. For example, a person who no longer works for a company rarely refers to himself or
herself as an "employee" of that company. 5 ' Granted, that person
was, at one time, "employed" by the employer, but that relationship has since terminated. Thus, the word "employed" cannot refer to a former employee within the context of Title VII.
However, the Supreme Court would have us believe quite the
contrary. The Court asserted that the term "employed" does not
necessarily mean "[plerforming work under an employer-employee
relationship," and could be read as "was employed" rather than "is
employed.""7 The Court took extraordinary measures to arrive at
this conclusion because simple logic dictates that if an individual
no longer works for an employer, that individual does not, in fact
cannot, consider himself or herself employed by that employer.
nary, contemporary, common meaning"); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506,
1509 (11th Cir. 1988) (describing the "cardinal rule" of statutory interpretation as defining statutory language in its ordinary manner and usage, unless
specifically stated otherwise).
152. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173-79 (1803) (discussing the
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of government. See also William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of
Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 475-85, 503-04
(1989) (analyzing the courts' role within the separation of powers doctrine).
153. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text describing the lack of
congressional intent regarding the inclusion of former employees.
154. Brief for Charles T. Robinson, Sr. at *18-19, Robinson (No. 95-1376).

The Petitioner attempts to assert that the word "employed" may apply to both
current and former employees because it is the past form of the verb employ.

Id. The Petitioner relies on this absurd distinction to make the argument that
such an ambiguity causes the entire definition of employee to be ambiguous.

Id.
155. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330-31.
156. Brief for Shell Oil Co. at *24, Robinson (No. 95-1376). The Respondent
also argues that a person no longer working at the company would instead
refer to "himself [or herself] as a former employee, or ex-employee, or retiree."
Id. at *24-25. See Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 897 (7th Cir.
1996)(Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the

nonsensical attempt to define "employed" as one who is "unemployed").
157. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 846-47 (1997).
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Further, that individual cannot be considered an employee of that
employer because there no longer exists a working relationship.
Based on this reasoning, the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson
almost adds ambiguity to the plain-meaning rule because of the
blatant disregard of such a simple and logical rule regarding statutory interpretation.
C. Exceptions to the PlainMeaning Rule
Although the inquiry should end where no ambiguities exist," there are, however, two exceptions to the plain-meaning rule.
The first exception to the plain meaning rule applies when a literal
interpretation of the statute would lead to absurd results, and the
court may then go beyond the plain language of the statute. 59 The
second exception applies only when the interpretation of the plain
language of the statute would result in a direct conflict with the
expressed intent of Congress.' 6° This Section first addresses a
number of absurdities, which would result if § 704(a) protected
former employees. Then, this Section shows how the integrity of
Title VII will remain without the inclusion of former employees.
The first exception allows courts to look beyond the plainmeaning of the statute if a literal interpretation would produce an
absurd result, even if no ambiguities exist.'' An absurd result is
something that is "so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense."" 2 Thus, courts are cautious in applying this exception.
A literal interpretation of § 704(a) of Title VII does not rise to this
"shocking" level. The statute, as enacted by Congress, clearly protects employees and applicants for employment. 6 3 It is difficult to
understand how this interpretation would grossly shock moral or
common sense because the statute prevents discrimination in the
workplace."
However, if the retaliation provision protected former employees, the opposite result would occur; looking beyond the plainmeaning of the statute to include former employees would produce
a result in direct conflict with expressed congressional intent regarding other parts of the statute. For example, the inclusion of
M

158. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989).
159. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930).
160. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242; Russello v. United Sates, 464
U.S. 16, 20 (1983).

161. Crooks, 282 U.S. at 59-60.
162. Id. at 60. Contrary to the policy arguments made by the majority of
circuits, a literal interpretation of Title VII's retaliation provision would
hardly rise to this level.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Title VII prohibits discrimination of any kind on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Id. Furthermore, Title VII
prohibits discrimination if an employee or applicant for employment opposes
discrimination or participates in EEOC proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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former employees in Title VII's definition of employee would significantly expand the coverage of Title VII. 165 Such an expansion

would destroy the specific requirement of fifteen or more employees in the definition of employer," thus directly conflicting Congress' clear intent to exclude small businesses from the statute.'67
Furthermore, an expansion of Title VII to include former employees would also produce absurd results in connection with a
number of states' laws designed to protect job references. 168 For
example, Illinois recently passed the Employment Record Disclosure Act which provides immunity to employers who provide
truthful information in employment references. 69 Yet, if § 704(a)
allowed former employees a cause of action for retaliation, even70
truthful information may not free the employer from liability.1
165. Brief for Shell Oil Co. at *23, Robinson (No. 95-1376). If Title VII protected former employees, a person bringing a charge under Title VII could use
those former employees to calculate the minimum number of employees required for their employer to be covered by the Act. Id. Thus, if an employer
employs less than fifteen employees, but has a high turnover rate, the inclusion of former employees would force this employer to come under the umbrella of Title VII. Id. at *23-24.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b). Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees

for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year." Id.
167. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text regarding the legislative
history of the word employer. By just looking at the limited definition of employer, Congress did not expect employers with less than fifteen current employees to be subject to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b). See generally Walters
v. Metropolitan-Educ. Enter., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996) (discussing the appropriate method for counting employees to determine the liability of small employers under Title VII). The
Seventh Circuit the held that the proper method of calculating the number of
employees in a Title VII case is by looking at the plain language of the statute.
Id. at 1228. Thus, the court adopted the method of looking "to the number of
employees physically at work on each day of the week." Id.
168. See generally CLARK BOARDMAN CALLAGHAN,

EMPLOYMENT COOR-

DINATOR,
EP-22,935-EP-22,935.51 (1996) (describing employer immunity
statutes for references made in good faith from 21 states). See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361 (West 1995
& Supp. 1996); CAL. GOv'T CODE § 1031.1 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.095 (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1996); 745 ILCS 46/10
(West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a (Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 26 § 598 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie
Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 40 § 61 (West Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996). These statutes all contain similar language,
which limits an employer's liability when giving a truthful job reference.
169. 745 ILCS 46/10 (West Supp. 1996).
170. See Brief for Shell Oil Co. at *37-40, Robinson (No. 95-1376) (noting the
conflict between state laws protecting employers from liability and retaliation
claims made by former employees under § 704(a)). If an employer provided a
negative, yet truthful, job reference for a former employee with a pending discrimination charge, the retaliation provision would nullify the employer's immunity granted by the state statute. Id. at *38-39. The assumption is that if
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This would create a chilling effect on employment references forcing employers to give nothing more than the former employee's job
description and length of employment.17 Furthermore, the problem with providing references persists because employers are becoming more concerned about
who they hire due to a rise in cases
72
involving negligent hiring.
The second exception only applies where Congress' clearly expressed its intent within the legislative history. 78 Yet, the established legislative history regarding Title VII's retaliation provision
is silent as to Congress' intent. 7 4 Thus, this exception does not
apply, and the language Congress used governs and should be in-

the former employer is providing a negative job reference, then it must be in
retaliation for the former employee's filing of the discrimination charges or
participating in Title VII proceedings. Id. The problem that arises with such
a negative assumption is what if the job reference is true, despite its poor
evaluation of the former employee?
171. See LEWIN G. JOEL III, EVERY EMPLOYEE'S GUIDE TO THE LAW 34 (1993)
(pointing out that defamation lawsuits have forced employers to "adopt a
name, rank and serial number approach" to employment references); Jonathan Vegosen, FiguringOut Whether to Tell All or Zip Your Lip on References,
CHI. LAW., Sept. 1996, at 15 (discussing how employers are "adopting a name,
rank and serial number approach" for job references to avoid being sued). In
his article, Vegosen points out that employers' fears of being sued greatly undermine the purpose behind employment references. Id. He states that
adopting such a policy limits the potential of prospective employers to gain
valuable information about the applicant's ability and job performance. Id.
172. JOEL, supra note 171, at 35. See DONALD H. WEISS, FAIR, SQUARE AND
LEGAL 87-94 (rev. ed. 1995) (discussing the employer's duty to exercise reasonable care when hiring someone); cf. Vegosen, supra note 171, at 15
(showing how some former employers have been sued by former employee's
new employers for providing negligent references). So, a former employer, by
limiting the information included in a job reference, may create additional
problems for the employer requesting the employment reference. Vegosen,
supra note 171, at 15. Furthermore, if the former employer refuses to give a
recommendation to a prospective employer, that action could also be considered retaliation if giving recommendations is an established company practice. Id. In both cases, the prospective employer may decide not to hire the
applicant for fear of a negligent hiring lawsuit by a third party. Id. For example, an Afro-American doctor files a discrimination charge with the EEOC,
and quits his job at that hospital. This doctor has a long history of malpractice claims, and a general reputation as a bad doctor. The doctor applies to
another hospital, which requests a reference from the doctor's prior employer.
The former employer knows that the doctor has a bad record and reputation,
but only discloses the doctor's dates of employment and job description to
avoid the possibility of a retaliation lawsuit. The prospective hospital hires
the doctor. Two months later, the doctor replaces the left hip of a patient
scheduled to receive a new right hip. Who is liable? As Vegosen accurately
points out, employers are left saying, "I'm damned if I say something, and I'm
damned if I don't." Id.
173. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983).
174. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text concluding that the legislative history provides no guidance as to Congress' intent regarding § 704(a).
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terpreted according to its ordinary meaning.'
Alternatively, if one were to rely on Congress' expressed purpose of Title VII, which is to prohibit discrimination in the workplace,. 6 the exclusion of former employees would not undermine
the integrity of such intent. On the contrary, the statute would
still prevent employers from retaliation and discrimination. Firing
current employees who bring discrimination charges, as well as
not hiring applicants on the basis that they had brought discrimination charges under Title VII, continues to be prohibited, and
therefore protects employees and applicants for employment.'77
This limitation applies to the very heart of Title 7VII by preventing
retaliation in a current employment relationship.'
D. The FairLabor StandardsAct and Other Remedial Statutes
Instead of looking into the legislative history and Congress'
intent, courts have also looked to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)'7 9 for guidance when interpreting Title VII.' ° The Supreme
Court, however, never once referred to nor otherwise acknowledged, the FLSA to support or bolster its rationale. Yet, when
comparing the two statutes, Congress' intent to limit Title VII's re-

175. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980);
Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1996).
176. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text discussing the purpose of
Title VII.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EMPLOYER EEO RESPONSIBILITIES B-14
(rev. 1996) (giving examples of unlawful retaliation practices). The types of
retaliation for which the statute was specifically designed to guard against
include: employers obstructing an employee's or applicant's participation in an
EEOC proceeding or investigation; threats and harassment on the job; refusing to promote or reassign to desired position according to established company policy; terminating the employee; and denying benefits related to employment benefits. Id. See also STEVEN MITCHELL SACK, FROM HIRING TO
FIRING 256-57 (1995) [hereinafter HIRING TO FIRING] (listing a number of retaliatory practices). Other types of retaliation may also include: moving the
employee to undesirable locations through transfer or reassignment; unjustly
increasing employee's workload; and unilaterally changing company policies
with specific intent to adversely affect the employee. Id.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
179. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994). Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 to regulate the wages and hours of employees. Rutherford Food
Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947); Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil,
324 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1945). See MICHAEL C. HARPER & SAMUEL ESTREICHER,
LABOR LAW 90 (4th ed. 1996) (stating the federal government guarantees
"minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime pay in the Fair Labor Standards Act.").
180. Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165-66
(10th Cir. 1977). See Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 143 (6th
Cir. 1977) (discussing how the FLSA can be useful in Title VII cases).
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taliation protection becomes much clearer. 8' Despite the provision
in the FLSA covering only an "employee" from retaliation, 82 courts
13
have often interpreted this word to include former employees
Unlike the FLSA, however, Title VII's retaliation provision is specifically limited by the inclusion of "applicants for employment."'8
This would suggest that the exclusion of former employees was not
inadvertent."
Furthermore, Congress made no changes to the wording of §
704(a) when it amended Title VII in 1991.1m If Congress intended
to include or protect former employees, it could have easily done so
during that time.8 7 Yet, Title VII, as enacted and amended, does
not include the terms "former employees."" Even more compelling than an analysis of the FLSA are other statutes which specifically include former employees under their protection!' 9 Regardless of the arguments that can be made supporting the inclusion of

181. The FLSA's retaliation provision provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person.., to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify
in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry
committee.
29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3).
182. Id.
183. Dunlop, 548 F.2d at 147. See generally Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972) (extending the protections of the informer's privilege in FLSA cases to former employees); Wirtz
v. B.A.C. Steel Products, Inc., 312 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1962) (stating that former
employees should be afforded no less protection than present employees).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
185. See Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1365 (4th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that
Congress could very well have included former employees had it so intended
due to the specific inclusion of "applicant[s] for employment").
186. Pub.L.No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
187. While it is true that the 1991 amendments to Title VII added punitive
damages to those remedies already available to protected individuals, those
new damages are purely penal in nature. 42 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(1) (1994). Contrary to the argument that the expansion of the remedies provides justification for the inclusion of former employees, the rule of narrow construction
specifically requires strict interpretation of statutes assessing penalties.
Moore, supra note 38, at 224, n.85; Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 91
(1959); Gold Kist, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 741 F.2d 344, 347 (11th
Cir. 1984).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The word former does not appear in this section
of Title VII. Id.
189. See generally The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §
1301 (4) (1994 & Supp. 1997); The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5
U.S.C. 88 1212 (a)(1), 1213 (a)(1), 1214 (a)(3), & 1221 (1994); The Federal
Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(b) (1994); The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1831j (1994); The Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. § 5000(b) (1994). All these statutes specifically include the terms
"former employees."
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former employees, Congress specifically did not include those individuals in the statutory language."
Congress' inclusion of
"applicants for employment" not only limited the interpretation of
Title VII's retaliation provision, but also provided protection for
those individuals looking for jobs who are no longer employed.
Moreover, individuals could have received protection from Title
VII without the Supreme Court expanding the plain language of §
704, as well as protection from other sources wholly separate and
apart from Title VII.
E. Remedies Available to FormerEmployees: Title VII and Beyond
This section will first focus on how those who are no longer
employed are protected from retaliation by § 704(a) as "applicants
for employment." Then this Section analyzes how other federal
laws protect former employees. Finally, this section analyzes how
state common law would protect the former employee.
Since Congress explicitly included "applicants for employment" under § 704(a),' 9' former employees have mistakenly assumed that Congress left them unprotected by the statute. This is
not true. Those individuals have simply been suing the wrong
people. 92 Instead of bringing a retaliation suit against a former
employer, the individual must bring the suit against the prospective employer as an applicant.'93 The prospective employer is prohibited from refusing to hire that applicant based solely on his or
her past discrimination charges or participation in EEOC investigations or hearings.' 94 Similarly, a former employee is protected
from discrimination as an applicant for employment if he or she reapplies to the former employer.'
Beyond the protection of Title VII, former employees will find
protection from retaliation by other federal statutes. For example,
the National Labor Relations Act protects former employees
against blacklisting.' 96 If a former employer attempted to withhold
other employee benefits such as severance payments, retirement
benefits, or medical benefits, the Employee Retirement Income Se190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
191. Id.
192. Telephone Interview with L. Christopher Butler, Counsel of Record for
Shell Oil Company (Sept. 5, 1996). See Brief for Shell Oil Co. at *26, Robinson
(No. 95-1376) (arguing that a retaliation cause of action exists against pro-

spective employers).
193. Brief for Shell Oil Co. at *26, Robinson (No. 95-1376).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
195. Id. This provision specifically protects "applicants for employment."

Id. If the individual is attempting to get rehired by his old company by reapplying, the former employer could not refuse employment solely out of re-

taliation for the applicant's involvement with discriminatory charges or EEOC
proceedings. Id.
196. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).
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curity Act would prevent such action. 19'
Beyond the aforementioned examples, there are a limited
number of ways a former employer can retaliate against a former
employee. However, former employees are protected from these
methods of retaliation without including "former employees"
within the context of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. The
most common type of "retaliation" by a former employer is giving
false, negative job references. 9 ' Yet, the common law provides a
remedy for this type of behavior in defamation.'99 If a former employer gives a negative job reference which he knows to be false or
acts with malicious intent, there would be grounds for a defamation cause of action. 200
Another example of "retaliation" by the former employer is
the use or threat of physical force.2 0 ' This type of conduct falls under the protection of the common law cause of action assault and
battery.'
In fact, the Third Circuit, which has held that former
employees are protected by § 704(a), was unwilling to extend protection to a physical assault by a former employer.'0 ' Since these
common law protections exist, there is no reason to take Title VII's
focus away from preventing discrimination in the workplace by focusing on post-employment actions and trying to expand the language of § 704(a) to include former employees.

III. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND A GUIDE FOR
EMPLOYERS

Despite the Supreme Court's activism in rewriting and expanding the language of § 704(a) to include former employees,
Congress is not prevented from acting to rectify this imposition on
the separation of powers established by our federal system. Section
A proposes a new federal statute which Congress could enact in
197. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461 (1994). See HIRING TO FIRING, supra note 177, at
84-91 (discussing ERISA benefits and protections).
198. See STEVEN MITCHELL SACK, THE EMPLOYEE RIGHT'S HANDBOOK 156
(1990) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (showing that 30% of all defamation claims
stem from former employees suing former employers).
199. WEISS, supra note 172, at 132. Weiss defines defamation as, "the communication, disclosure, or publication of private information with malice or to
someone who does not have the right to know." Id.
200. See WEISS, supra note 172, at 122 (defining defamation, slander, libel
and malice).
201. See Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 388 (3rd Cir. 1995)
(describing a hypothetical situation in which a former employee is physically
assaulted); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing a
former employer's alleged attack on a former employee).
202. Brief for Shell Oil Co. at *29, Robinson (No. 95-1376).
203. Nelson, 51 F.3d at 388. In this case, the plaintiff was also denied protection from her former employer's alleged retaliation in the form of defamatory remarks. Id. at 388-89. The court simply stated that, "she does not need
a section 704(a) retaliation action to obtain relief." Id. at 388.
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order to reestablish its role as law-maker. However, until Congress acts, employers must now beware of their actions towards
former employees. Section B offers advice to employers faced with
job references for former employees who filed discrimination
charges or participated in EEOC proceedings or investigations.
A. A New FederalReference Act: Reestablishing the Lawmakers
Congress should enact a new law entitled the Federal Employment Reference Act (FERA) to create a uniform federal statute
on which employers across the country could rely when making job
references in good faith, as well as to restore the separation of
powers. The Act's purpose would be to prevent former employers
from providing employment references which are discriminatory in
nature. Using language from Title VII,2 ' FERA would prohibit a
former employer from including information based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. In addition, FERA would prohibit
a former employer from making any reference to any charge of discrimination made by the former employee. This law would apply
strictly to former employees seeking references from former employers.
The FERA also would include two major aspects. First, the
former employee must show that the former employer had an improper motive for giving a negative recommendation. Second, the
burden would shift onto the former employer to show that the references were truthful and made in good faith. By enacting this
new law, Congress would protect former employees without including them in the statutory language of § 704(a) of Title VII.
B. Employers: Erron the Side of Caution
Despite the growing number of states enacting legislation
immunizing employers from liability when providing truthful references made in good faith," 5 employers should err on the side of
caution to avoid litigation. Employers should refrain from giving
unfavorable job references, especially when motivated by malice
and other Title VII discrimination charges are pending.2° In addition, employers must be aware of the types of statements they are
making on job references, and to whom they are making those
statements. 27
The employer should implement a policy in which employees
are given performance evaluations on a regular basis. These performance evaluations provide documented proof of an employee's

204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
205. See supra note 168 and accompanying text discussing state employer
immunity statutes.
206. HIRING TO FIRING, supra note 177, at 305.
207. WEISS, supra note 172, at 132.
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ability. These evaluations could also provide an employer guidance when giving a job reference to a former employee's prospective employer. In addition, the written documentation could also
strengthen the employer's argument that the reference was truthful and made in good faith.2"
In most instances, employers should refrain from giving
negative job references. A negative reference, in light of pending
discrimination charges, only invites a retaliation suit no matter
how truthful the reference. However, certain extenuating circumstances may warrant the use of a unfavorable references, such as if
the former employee may inflict great bodily harm on himself or
herself or others or otherwise place others in danger. Here again,
a former employer must have a good faith basis for making such
assertions in a reference, they must be truthful, and in the end,
the former employer may still be subject to a lawsuit based on retaliation. This is because the Robinson decision totally ignores
whether the references were made in good faith or were truthful.
Basically, most employers should continue to use the "name-rankserial number" approach to giving references where no other policies or period evaluation process has been established.
CONCLUSION

"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor
less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words
mean so many different things.'"2 9
Congress chose to protect "his employees" and "applicants
from employment;" nothing more, nothing less. While it is true
that words can have numerous meanings, such is not the case in
the context of § 704(a). The enacted statutory language is controlling. Title VII is a remedial act designed to eliminate discrimination in the workplace. Despite the well articulated policy arguments favoring a broad interpretation of § 704(a), the retaliation
provision is self-limiting and must be interpreted according to established rules of statutory construction. If no other remedies
from retaliation were available to former employees, those policy
arguments would carry much greater weight. But, because other
federal statutes provide remedies, as well as the common law, Title
VII's retaliation provision should not protect former employees. A
broad interpretation of § 704(a) which includes former employees,
208. Employer may be protected by a "qualified privilege" in defamation
cases. FRED S. STEINGOLD, THE EMPLOYER'S LEGAL HANDBOOK 10/41 (1994).

This privilege can only be asserted when there is a "common interest" between the two parties (the requester and the requestee), and the former employer limits the information given in a job reference to such interest. Id.
209. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASs, 94 (1946).
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in essence, rewrites the statute and strikes a blow to the very
foundation of our federal system-the separation of powers. The
Supreme Court went too far when it decided, in Robinson, to create a safe harbor for bad employees by rewriting the plain language of § 704 to include former employees.
As a result, employers must now be more careful when giving
references to former employees or their prospective employer.
Employers should consider setting up an evaluation procedure to
better document the performance of their employees. Recommendation could therefore be substantiated and supported by those
evaluations. Although truth is ultimately a defense, employers
have to be cognizant that a former employee could still bring a retaliation charge, whether or not the reference is truthful.

